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Abstract. Globalisation and interregional exchange of peo-
ple, goods, and services has boosted the importance of and
reliance on all kinds of transport networks. The linear struc-
ture of road networks is especially sensitive to natural haz-
ards. In southern Norway, steep topography and extreme
weather events promote frequent traffic disruption caused
by debris flows. Topographic susceptibility and trigger fre-
quency maps serve as input into a hazard appraisal at the
scale of first-order catchments to quantify the impact of de-
bris flows on the road network in terms of a failure likelihood
of each link connecting two network vertices, e.g. road junc-
tions. We compute total additional traffic loads as a function
of traffic volume and excess distance, i.e. the extra length of
an alternative path connecting two previously disrupted net-
work vertices using a shortest-path algorithm. Our risk met-
ric of link failure is the total additional annual traffic load, ex-
pressed as vehicle kilometres, because of debris-flow-related
road closures. We present two scenarios demonstrating the
impact of debris flows on the road network and quantify
the associated path-failure likelihood between major cities
in southern Norway. The scenarios indicate that major routes
crossing the central and north-western part of the study area
are associated with high link-failure risk. Yet options for de-
tours on major routes are manifold and incur only little ad-
ditional costs provided that drivers are sufficiently well in-
formed about road closures. Our risk estimates may be of
importance to road network managers and transport compa-
nies relying on speedy delivery of services and goods.
1 Introduction
Society’s reliance on transport networks has grown exten-
sively, commensurately amplifying potentially adverse con-
sequences of network malfunction (Taylor and D’Este, 2003;
Demšar et al., 2008; Andrey, 2010). Linear infrastructures
such as road and rail networks, pipelines, and power grids
are sensitive to catastrophic disruption (Schulz, 2007). Such
network failure can be caused by, among others, vehicle ac-
cidents, construction work, natural hazards, and terrorism
(Tacnet et al., 2012). These incidents can result in reductions
or interruptions in serviceability and thus determine the reli-
ability of a network (Berdica, 2002). Transport network re-
liability is the degree of certainty with which travel between
A and B within the time period t is possible (Immers et al.,
2004); reliability is a function of the likelihood that an inci-
dent will cause network malfunctioning and is determined by
the likelihood of the incidence itself and the robustness of the
network against failure (Murray and Grubesic, 2007). Net-
work vulnerability analyses relate this likelihood of failure
to its economic and societal consequences (Jenelius, 2009).
Most road network analyses are concerned with urban net-
works where traffic interruption often leads to congestion af-
fecting a large number of people (Taylor and D’Este, 2003;
Appert and Chapelon, 2013). However, in mountainous areas
traffic disruption due to natural hazards such as landslides
may also present a threat to human life and cause significant
delays, reduced accessibility, and high economic costs (Scott
et al., 2006). Recent statistics suggest that ∼ 45 000 km of
road and railways are exposed to landsliding worldwide (Dil-
ley, 2005). Hence, there is increasing demand for quantitative
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studies that assess the transport network analyses on interre-
gional and national scales (Taylor et al., 2006).
In this study we focus on quantifying the risk of traffic net-
work downtimes caused by natural hazards and draw on the
example of major roads in Norway. The following case il-
lustrates the need for appraising the consequences of road
closure: a flash flood in July 2006 washed away 30 m of
the highway E14 that connects Östersund in Sweden and
Trondheim in Norway and sustains daily traffic of 1000–
2000 vehicles/day. The shortest detour between both ends of
the washed out road section was > 200 km; partial reopening
of the road took 12 days. The estimated costs of repair were
EUR 1.2 million (Jenelius, 2010). Yet this assessment failed
to allocate costs for additional travel time and fuel consump-
tion required to circumnavigate the closed road. A calcula-
tion that assumes an average fuel consumption of 6 L/100 km
and a fuel price of EUR 1.5 L−1 would incur additional costs
of between 216 000 and EUR 432 000, or up to 45 % of the
structural damage. This simplified calculation merely takes
addition fuel consumption into account and illustrates impor-
tant costs often neglected in assessing road damage and calls
for further enquiry. Moreover, other costs related to work
time loss and/or delays in delivery (especially perishables)
are not considered. These may add even higher additional
costs than computed for fuel consumption.
Norway’s steep topography and high frequency of extreme
weather events expose a large portion of its transport in-
frastructure to natural hazards (Bargel et al., 2011; Bjordal
and Helle, 2011; Norem and Sandersen, 2012). Norway is a
large and sparsely populated country, and roads crossing re-
mote parts are often the only connection between larger cities
(Fig. 1). Hence, unanticipated detours often involve long ad-
ditional distances. Moreover, the demand for road service-
ability has increased notably in the last decades. The total
annual person transport carried out by private cars in Norway
had doubled to∼ 80 % by 2002 as compared to 1960. During
the same period, the volume of transported goods increased
9-fold and remains the dominant mode of land transport in
Norway (Boge, 2006). Mountain valley floors collect most
of the incoming natural water and sediment fluxes. Roads lo-
cated in such valleys are often affected by rapid mass move-
ments that degrade roads and interrupt traffic flow (Winter
et al., 2008). While rockfalls and snow avalanches are most
frequent disturbances, the rarer debris flows were responsi-
ble for the majority of all pavement damages related to mass
wasting from 2006 to 2009 (Bjordal and Helle, 2011). Even
though this study quantified structural damages to road in-
frastructure from natural hazards, we are not aware of any
analysis of the overall functional value of the road network
in Norway.
Here our aim is to merge graph theory and quantitative
risk assessment to quantify the functional impact of debris
flows in terms of road closure and associated risks for the
south Norwegian road network (Fig. 1). We use a two-step
approach. First, we gauge the likelihood of debris-flow oc-
Figure 1. Study area and road network connecting major cities in
southern Norway. All traffic data were provided by the Norwegian
Public Road Administration Statens Vegvesen. Road characterisa-
tion and regions delineated by white boundaries correspond to Nor-
wegian nomenclature.
currence in first-order catchments to determine, on a statis-
tical basis, how frequently roads need to be shut down in
consequence. Second, we estimate the functional value of
the roads rather than their structural damage. We express this
functional value as the calculated total additional traffic load
resulting from road closures and assess the ensuing risk in
terms of total excess road kilometres per year. We conclude
by highlighting potential network weaknesses tied to two dif-
ferent debris-flow scenarios.
2 Data
With an area of ∼ 320 000 km2 mainland Norway extends
over nearly 1800 km in a north–south direction (57◦57′ N to
71◦11′ N). About 30 % of the country features mountainous
areas with steep slopes and harsh climatic conditions (Fischer
et al., 2012). The annual precipitation may exceed 4000 mm
on the west coast, and the annual mean temperature ranges
between −8 ◦C in northern and central southern Norway and
+8 ◦C along the southern coast (Dyrrdal et al., 2012). We fo-
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Figure 2. (a) Topographic susceptibility, i.e. aggregated probability of debris-flow occurrence, in first-order catchments; (b) annual trigger
frequency in first-order catchments; (c) average traffic volume per day.
cus on the area south of 64◦ N, which covers the four regions
of Vestlandet, Sørlandet, Østlandet, and Midt-Norge (Fig. 1).
Several mountain regions form a major divide between Vest-
landet and Østlandet, promoting maritime and continental
climates respectively.
Our analysis covers > 40 000 km of road network. Eu-
ropavegs are the main arterial roads that connect the different
regions, whereas Riksvegs and Fylkevegs are regional and lo-
cal roads respectively (Fig. 1). We disregarded smaller urban
roads not contributing to the regional or interregional con-
nectivity. Norwegian roads have a maximum speed limit of
80–100 km h−1 and usually consist of one track in each di-
rection but are multi-tracked close to the main cities. In more
densely populated areas and along the coast the network den-
sity is high, while the mountainous area in the central part of
the study area has a thin road network.
Our analysis draws from previous work on a topographic
susceptibility model for debris-flow source areas (Meyer
et al., 2014) and a threshold model specifying hydro-
meteorological conditions needed to trigger debris flows
(Meyer et al., 2012). Both models are calibrated and val-
idated with a national mass-movement database featuring
> 500 debris-flow events recorded between 1979 and 2008
(http://www.skrednett.no/; Jaedicke et al., 2009; Meyer et
al., 2012, 2014). The topographic susceptibility is based on
a weights-of-evidence model using the two topographic pa-
rameters of slope and flow accumulation with a resolution
of 25 m× 25 m. This model identifies potential debris-flow
source areas and assigns spatial probabilities to each grid
cell. Susceptibility to debris-flow initiation is high where
steep slopes (∼ 20 to∼ 60◦) and contributing areas of∼ 0.02
to 2 km2 combine, i.e. mainly in the fjord landscape along the
west coast.
Trigger frequencies rely on an intensity–duration thresh-
old derived from past hydro-meteorological conditions
(Meyer et al., 2012). In Norway, such critical hydro-
meteorological conditions are usually tied to heavy rainfall
and intense snow melt. Thresholds are ranked (minimum,
medium, and maximum) at 1 km× 1 km resolution and nor-
malised by the precipitation day normal to account for dif-
ferences in the climatic regime. We use the diurnal medium
threshold and calculate the mean annual trigger frequency for
the period 1981–2010 (Meyer et al., 2012).
For this study, we spatially aggregated the gridded data
on topographic susceptibility and annual trigger probabil-
ity within first-order catchments (http://atlas.nve.no; Fig. 2a,
b). First-order catchments are the smallest hydrometric refer-
ence areas in the officially used national catchment database
REGINE and have a median area of 8.5 km2. We multi-
plied the fraction of terrain susceptible to debris flows with
the associated probability of occurrence for each first-order
catchment. The topographic susceptibility is highest in Vest-
landet but decreases to the east with lower topographic relief
(Fig. 2a). We spatially averaged the annual trigger frequency
of all pixels within each catchment. Trigger frequencies are
highest on the plateaus between Vestlandet and Østlandet
and may reach more than seven triggering events per year
(Fig. 2b).
We assess the daily traffic volume per road from data
by the Norwegian Public Road Administration Statens Veg-
vesen (Fig. 2c). Traffic volumes are high in urban areas
and along the coast where the population density is highest.
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Figure 3. Example of a road network including terms used in this
study.
There, route sections are frequented commonly by > 10 000
cars/day. Around Oslo, the capital and largest city of Norway,
average traffic per day exceeds 50 000 cars/day, whereas the
mountainous core of the study area has much lower volumes
(< 2500 cars/day). Data on traffic volumes are available for
∼ 93 % of the studied roads.
3 Methods
3.1 Graph theory
We use graph theory for quantifying likely impacts of de-
bris flows on Norway’s road network. In the following we
briefly review some basic terminology, algorithms, and as-
sumptions pertinent to our application of graph theory and
road networks. For a more detailed introduction into graph
theory we refer to Gross and Yellen (2005) and Heckmann
et al. (2015). A graph G(VE) is the mathematical represen-
tation of a network defined by two disjoint sets of vertices
V and links E. A link is defined by two vertices u and v,
and two vertices are adjacent to each other when a link {u,v}
connects them. The topology of a graph is stored in an ad-
jacency matrix with n rows and n columns, where n is the
number of vertices in the network. An element in row u and
column v in the adjacency matrix is unity if there is a link
between u and v; otherwise the element is zero. We make
the simplifying assumption that all links can be traversed in
both directions. Hence, our road network is an undirected
graph and the associated adjacency matrix is symmetric with
respect to the main diagonal. Vertices represent either road
junctions or dead ends and thus have 1, 3, or more incident
links (or vertex degrees). We deviate from this definition in
cases where two or more distinct roads share the same pair
of nodes by introducing two-degree dummy vertices (Fig. 3).
When calculating the adjacency matrix of the road network,
these dummy vertices avoid the collapse of two or more links
into a single link. We furthermore did not include any loops,
i.e. links with both ends sharing the same vertex.
Each road link has metric attributes such as length and traf-
fic volume that we used as weights in a shortest-path calcu-
lation. A path or route is a sequence of vertices connected by
links with no vertex being visited more than once (Demšar et
al., 2008). An origin vertex is connected with a destination
vertex if there is a path between them (Fig. 3). The shortest
path is the route between two vertices that minimizes the sum
of weights. We assume that all motorists choose the path with
the shortest total travel distance between two road junctions.
Reorganisation of a shortest path between two vertices is re-
quired if a link fails due to debris-flow impact and subsequent
road closure (Fig. 3). We assume that if this were the case for
a link belonging to the shortest path, motorists would use the
shortest alternative route. Thus, our simulation emulates the
functioning of vehicle navigation systems that in fact rely on
a similar set of graph theoretic algorithms. We refer to ex-
cess distance as the difference between the shortest detour
path and the original distance along a blocked road link. We
compute excess distance for each link in the road network
by setting the respective element in the distance matrix to
zero and then reassessing the shortest alternative path. The
distance matrix resembles the adjacency matrix, but its non-
zero elements contain the travel distance between two adja-
cent vertices. Excess distance is a local measure expressing
the length of detour between two adjacent vertices, whereas
the total detour around a blocked road may be lower if the
distance between origin and destination allows for more opti-
mal alternative routes (Fig. 3). We focus on the road network
connecting the seven major cities in southern Norway, i.e.
Oslo, Lillehammer, Trondheim, Ålesund, Bergen, Stavanger,
and Kristiansand. We used MATLAB version R2012a (The
MathWorks, 2012) and MatlabBGL, a toolbox that interfaces
with the Boost Graph Library (Siek et al., 2001) for our net-
work analysis, and Dijkstra’s algorithm to compute the short-
est paths.
3.2 Risk framework
We assess the probability and consequences of link failure
within the risk framework. In its most general form, risk R
can be defined as R =H ×C, where H is the probability of
a threatening event (hazard), and C are the consequences re-
lated to H . The consequences C are a product of the value
of the elements at risk E and their vulnerability V such that
the risk equation becomes R =H ×E×V . Vulnerability V
is a factor between 0 and 1, indicating the severity of ex-
pected loss given a hazard H , and expressed as a fraction of
the total value of E. In the context of network vulnerabil-
ity, monetary values of road segments (pavement, side rails,
etc.) can be included to refer to the structural vulnerability
of the elements at risk. Hazard H may express the proba-
bility of occurrence of a potentially damaging phenomenon
within a given time period and area (Downing et al., 2001).
We approximate H by computing the likelihood of debris-
flow occurrence (Fig. 4) as the product of the topographical
susceptibility (Meyer et al., 2014) and the annual trigger fre-
quency for each first-order catchment (Meyer et al., 2012).
We did not convert this likelihood to a normalised probability
in order to preserve information about the annual triggering
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Figure 4. Flow chart showing aggregation and processing of data
on different scales: pixel, catchment, link, and path. For detailed
description of aggregation process see text.
frequency. In any case, the shape of the probability distribu-
tion of H remains the same. We then assigned the likelihood
of debris-flow occurrence in each catchment to the adjacent
road links. In cases where a road link intersected with more
than one first-order catchment, we used the sum of topo-
graphical susceptibilities times the highest trigger frequency
along the respective road link (Fig. 4). Thus, derived link-
failure likelihoods reflect the assumption that debris flows
occurring in small mountain catchments reach and take out
the road for 1 day eventually. Hence, we assume a link vul-
nerability of unity. This is a strongly simplified assumption as
not all debris flows in these catchments will cause equal dam-
ages on roads and may be subject to different closure times
accordingly. However, besides practical reasons this assump-
tion seems reasonable given that our analysis is based on de-
bris flows that had impacted roads in the past. We set the
likelihood to zero for ferry connections and tunnels longer
than 1 km as we assume these reaches are safe from debris-
flow impact. However, we do not consider existing mitigation
measures that protect roads from the impact of debris flows.
We note that our use of link-failure likelihood is equivalent
to the complement of link reliability, a term commonly used
in transport network analysis (Murray and Grubesic, 2007;
Boge, 2006). We preferred the term likelihood to keep the
term consistent with related measures on catchment and path
level used in our analysis (Fig. 4).
Our attention is on expenditures in terms of additional traf-
fic loads resulting from road closures and thus the functional
Figure 5. Excess distances resulting from potential road closures.
value of the network links. The product of traffic volume (ve-
hicles/day), excess distance (km), and closure time (days)
gives the total additional average traffic load per road clo-
sure (vehicles× km) (Fig. 4). Assuming that characteristic
closure times amount to 1 day, we multiply link-failure like-
lihood (1 year−1) with additional traffic load to obtain the
annual debris-flow-related link risk (vehicles× km year−1)
(Fig. 3). We explore the applicability of this approach in two
scenarios. The simpler scenario involves road closure and
subsequent traffic diversion by a single debris flow. An alter-
native scenario is informed by the historical mass-movement
database (http://www.skrednett.no/; Jaedicke et al., 2009).
This inventory indicates that extreme weather events often
trigger multiple debris flows; 667 documented debris flows
were associated with 285 triggering events such that one rain-
fall or snow-melt event triggered more than two debris flows
in average.
4 Results
4.1 Link risk analysis
Our network analysis shows that computed excess distances
are longest (> 200 km) through the central part of the study
area (Fig. 5). Short alternative routes are available near
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Figure 6. (a) Link-failure likelihood and (b) total additional traffic load per road closure; main routes between seven large cities in southern
Norway are marked in yellow.
Table 1. Matrix of distances on main routes (km) between major cities (lower left) and the associated total path-failure likelihood (event/year)
(upper right); cells are highlighted in bold according to quartile-based classification of failure likelihood.
Kristiansand Stavanger Oslo Trondheim Bergen Lillehammer Ålesund
Kristiansand 0 0.010 0.014 0.024 0.038 0.022 0.072
Stavanger 245 0 0.019 0.082 0.029 0.032 0.093
Oslo 317 447 0 0.010 0.034 0.005 0.062
Trondheim 806 816 490 0 0.084 0.016 0.036
Bergen 453 209 470 637 0 0.064 0.070
Lillehammer 466 548 167 342 433 0 0.061
Ålesund 762 590 531 335 381 370 0
cities and along the coast. Longer detours also characterise
road sections along the Swedish border, although alterna-
tives become available there when the Swedish road net-
work is used. The link-failure likelihood varies between 0
and 0.02 events/year and is highest in the north of Vest-
landet (Fig. 6a), largely mimicking the topographic suscep-
tibility (Fig. 2a). Similarly, higher trigger frequencies along
the mountain plateaus contribute to an increase of this likeli-
hood (Fig. 2b).
The total additional traffic load per road closure varies
widely between 101 and > 106 vehicle km per day (Fig. 6b).
The highest loads may occur not only in the mountainous in-
terior of the study area where road density is low and excess
distances are high but also near cities and along the coast with
commensurately high traffic volumes (Fig. 2c). We computed
the maximum loads for a road section stretching from Trond-
heim towards the Swedish border. In addition to a large traffic
volume of > 25 000 cars/day, the excess distances are quite
large (> 300 km) along this section.
A high annual debris-flow-related link risk of
> 1000 vehicle km year−1 characterises Vestlandet (Fig. 7),
an area that combines high topographic susceptibility,
hydro-meteorological trigger frequencies, and long excess
distances. High traffic volumes near Bergen and Ålesund
exacerbate this risk. Parts of main routes linking the larger
cities are also tagged with high risks: 56 out of the 100 links
with the highest link risks are located on the main routes.
Summing up the link-failure likelihoods along routes be-
tween major cities in the study area, we obtain the total
path-failure likelihood (Table 1). In this regard, the main
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Figure 7. Estimated annual link risk expressed as vehicle km; main
routes between seven large cities in southern Norway are marked in
yellow.
route between Ålesund and Stavanger has the highest like-
lihood of being blocked by debris flows with an average re-
turn period of ∼ 10 years. A comparable blockage potential
characterises the routes Trondheim–Bergen, and Trondheim–
Stavanger. Similarly, all routes crossing the mountainous in-
terior in north–south or west–east direction have higher path-
failure likelihoods than routes circumventing this area.
4.2 Scenarios
Two scenarios highlight the applicability of our approach.
In Scenario 1, we identified a 75 km long road section on
Riksveg 55 between Lom and Skjolden as the section with
the highest link-failure likelihood, which we expect occurs
every ∼ 50 years on average. Riksveg 55 is one of the main
interregional connections between Bergen and Trondheim
used by ∼ 4000 cars/day. The scenario involves a road clo-
sure between Lom and Skjolden (Fig. 8). The shortest de-
tour between these villages is via Stryn and has an ex-
cess distance of 240 km, i.e. more than 3 times the origi-
nal road section (Fig. 8b). The total additional traffic load
would be 960 000 vehicle km, assuming 1 day of road clo-
sure. Given a fuel consumption of 6 L/100 km and a fuel
price of EUR 1.5/L, this total additional traffic load would
incur top-on fuel costs of EUR 86 000. With a return pe-
riod of ∼ 50 years, the expected annual detour costs are
EUR 1720 for this road section only on the premise that mo-
torists take the calculated detour route irrespective of their
origin and destination (blue route, Fig. 8b). However, the
shortest detour between Bergen and Trondheim would not
pass either Lom or Skjolden. The alternative quickest route
has an excess distance of 67 km, incurring additional fuel
costs of ∼EUR 20 000, assuming a daily traffic volume of
4000 cars between Bergen and Trondheim (yellow route,
Fig. 8b).
In Scenario 2, western Norway (Vestlandet) was hit by
extreme rainfall brought by low “Kristin”; local rainfall
on 14 September 2005 exceeded 100–200 mm day−1 (Slet-
ten, 2009). The area around Bergen experienced particularly
heavy rainfall that triggered a large number of debris flows.
At least 49 of these caused documented traffic disruption on
several roads and railways. In Bergen, 3 people died, 7 were
injured, and 152 were evacuated (Bargel et al., 2011). Traf-
fic on the main routes between Bergen and cities in the east
(Trondheim, Lillehammer, Oslo) were impacted by debris
flows, while routes in the west (Ålesund, Stavanger, Kris-
tiansand) remained accessible (Fig. 9a). Excess distances re-
lated to these link failures vary considerably between the
affected city connections (Table 2); while the detour from
Bergen to Oslo is just 13 km or 3 % longer than the original
route, the excess distance for the Bergen–Lillehammer con-
nection is 89 km or 21 % of original length.
On 15 November 2005, another extreme precipitation
event (“Loke”) hit the Norwegian west coast (Aall, 2013).
Some 63 documented debris flows occurred over a large area
in the northern part of Vestlandet, causing massive rail and
road traffic delays. Again, main routes between Bergen and
eastern cities were disturbed (Fig. 9b), this time also includ-
ing the main route to Ålesund (Table 2). The computed ex-
cess distances from Bergen were between 13 and 67 km to
Oslo and Trondheim, i.e. 3 and 11 % larger than the original
distances respectively (Table 2).
5 Discussion
We quantified the failure likelihood of road links po-
tentially impacted by debris flows in southern Norway
by merging estimates of topographic susceptibility and
hydro-meteorological trigger frequency. The national mass-
movement inventory (http://www.skrednett.no/; Jaedicke et
al., 2009) gives some insight into past road closures by debris
flows: data from 2003 to 2007 demonstrate that the road links
most frequently impacted by debris flows have a substantially
higher failure rate than our computed minimum return period
of∼ 50 years suggests. The 4 years of detailed data coverage,
however, fall short of offering substantial validation of our
model concerning the simulated failure likelihoods. These
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Figure 8. Illustration of network routing with (a) open access between Lom and Skjolden and (b) under temporary closure of road between
the two cities. Legend to overview map is given in Fig. 7.
underestimates may partly result from a general improve-
ment of the reporting quality from 2003 to 2007 as opposed
to the preceding years used for model training. Nevertheless,
the computed link-failure likelihoods are an unprecedented
attempt to rank at the regional scale the road-network seg-
ments according to their propensity of disruption. This infor-
mation is vital concerning potential debris-flow impacts and
is extensible to other, more frequent, processes such as snow
avalanches and rockfalls that share similar topographic and
climatic prerequisites (Slaymaker, 2010). Clearly both ap-
praisals of the susceptibility and triggers of snow avalanches
and rockfall would need due adjustment if added to our net-
work analysis. However, the results of our analysis present a
first step towards a more comprehensive risk assessment that
includes the risk related to functional damages exemplified
by one specific type of rapid mass movement.
We quantified the failure likelihood for the shortest paths
between major cities in southern Norway, namely Oslo,
Lillehammer, Trondheim, Ålesund, Bergen, Stavanger, and
Kristiansand. However, we did not account for temporary
closure during winter months, which is common for parts of
these connections. Hence, the seasonal occurrence probabil-
ity of debris flows may modulate our assessment of link- and
path-failure likelihoods. Given that most documented debris
flows occurred in autumn, whereas winter months are less
affected by debris flows and related road closures, we sur-
mise that our annual likelihoods are minimum estimates. The
available data on daily traffic volume are averages, however,
and thus do not allow resolving any temporal pattern.
Our computed excess distances relate necessary detours
around a failed road link to the original distances and draw on
graph theory, which is a common, straightforward, and math-
ematically rigorous method used in network analysis (Holm-
gren, 2006; Grubesic et al., 2008). This approach requires a
well-documented road network without any topological er-
rors (Erath et al., 2009). International road connections may
compromise this analysis: along the Swedish border the com-
puted excess distances are biased because we miss possible
shorter detours that make use of the Swedish road network.
Including the road networks beyond national borders is likely
to yield more robust results for some of the excess distances.
Our method of computing excess distances relies on topol-
ogy but may neglect a number of alternative options of deal-
ing with closed roads. Two cases require that the entire dis-
tance of the alternative route connecting both ends of the
link needs to be passed without much alternative: (1) re-
gional travellers have the two end vertices of the failed link
as origin and destination, or (2) interregional travellers are
not aware of the road closure until they reach the disrupted
link in question. However, motorists’ knowledge about spe-
cific traffic conditions regarding potential detours is another
point that may compromise the validity of computed excess
distances (Lyons, 2006; Nyblom, 2014): drivers may be in-
formed about road closures well in advance and choose alter-
native routes that deviate from the vertices enclosing the im-
passable road. This information status depends, among oth-
ers, on the time between the announcement of road closure
and the onset of journey, the distribution and reception of
information by authorities, and the technical capability of
drivers to receive this information. Our scenario-based as-
sessment of such alternative paths between larger cities in
southern Norway demonstrates that prior knowledge con-
cerning road closures leads to significantly reduced excess
distance (Fig. 4). Scenario 1 indicates that the ratios of ex-
cess distances to the original travel distance are larger for
regional than interregional traffic. Scenario 2 also illustrates
that multiple link failures may prolong the shortest path be-
tween cities in few cases only, e.g. in September 2005 be-
tween Bergen and Lillehammer. These results hinge on the
assumption that travellers are informed about road closures
and alternative paths do not suffer from subsequent failures.
We stress that our network analysis focuses on the total ad-
ditional traffic load per road closure and not on any additional
costs incurred by structural road damage. Clearly, the total
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Table 2. Distances between Bergen and other cities with intact road network and excess distances following road closures specified in
scenarios 1 and 2, given in km. Ratio of excess distance to original route length shown in parentheses.
Kristiansand Stavanger Oslo Trondheim Lillehammer Ålesund
Original 453 209 480 637 433 381
Scenario 1 0 0 13 (3 %) 32 (5 %) 89 (21 %) 0
Scenario 2 0 0 13 (3 %) 67 (11 %) 48 (11 %) 28 (7 %)
Figure 9. Scenarios investigating effects of extreme rainfall events (a) “Kristin” and (b) “Loke” in 2005 and related debris flows along routes
between Bergen and other large cities in southern Norway.
additional costs from detours involve aspects of fuel con-
sumption and availability, actual fuel pricing, driving style,
road type, local speed limits, and many others. We refrained
from including these parameters in our calculation because of
their high variability and favoured casting our risk estimates
in vehicle distances per year instead. Fuel consumption is
not directly proportional to distance, and actual numbers are
subject to rapid price oscillations. However, if reliable infor-
mation is available, this parameter should be included in the
risk calculation to obtain monetary costs associated with de-
tours. We also did not account for the instance that car drivers
would occasionally accept small extra distances, e.g. the use
of a road instead of a ferry, as waiting times and travel speed
will have a direct impact on the overall travel time. Future
road-network risk analyses may wish to devote more atten-
tion to such effects of alternative transport modes, different
road types, etc. on travel time and fuel consumption.
Expressing the link-failure risk in annual vehicle kilome-
tres is the major contribution of our region-wide assessment
of the functional value of individual road network segments.
This approach goes beyond standard appraisals of road man-
agement strategies based on structural values alone. This is
because official stakeholders such as road and railway admin-
istrations are usually more interested in the structural dam-
age they are paying for (Norem and Sandersen, 2012). Our
computed potential costs arising from detours due to debris-
flow-related road closures are not included in this bill and
are shared amongst individual motorists. However, these ex-
ternal costs are likely to increase if including transport of
goods, especially perishables, and delays in delivery in the
risk analysis (Bråthen, 2001). While costs related to time de-
lay and fuel may be affordable for the individual, these costs
may become critical for companies whose major income de-
pends on the transport industry or the supply of goods (Lak-
shmanan, 2010).
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6 Conclusions
We coupled graph theory with quantitative risk assessment
to estimate the annual expected costs of detours arising from
road closure by debris flows in southern Norway. A combina-
tion of topographic susceptibility and hydro-meteorological
trigger frequency in first-order catchments formed the basis
for assessing the likelihood of a given road link to fail follow-
ing debris-flow impact. From this we estimated link-failure
likelihoods that, together with data on traffic volumes and
computed excess distances, resulted in risk estimates con-
cerning the functional values of road links. We expressed this
risk as the expected additional total of annual vehicle kilo-
metres required for detours around closed road sections. Our
study concentrated on link-based calculations but also ad-
dressed scenarios of path-failure likelihoods between larger
cities and effects of debris flows causing multiple road clo-
sures.
Debris-flow-related link-failure risk is highest in the
mountainous interior of southern Norway, a region that needs
to be traversed in order to connect the major cities. This high
risk results from high link-failure likelihoods, moderate traf-
fic volumes, and high excess distances. Nevertheless, detour
options are manifold for these major trunk routes with only
little additional costs provided that drivers are sufficiently
well informed about road closures. Our analysis indicates
that effective reduction of these costs requires timely pub-
lication of information pertinent to road closure. Overall, we
estimate this risk at ∼ 10–1000 additional vehicle kilometres
per year. This estimate may be readily converted to monetary
costs where data on fuel cost and consumption are available.
We stress that these anticipated costs, although likely to be
shared by individual motorists, are minimum costs. Compa-
nies relying on timely delivery of goods and perishables may
wish to consider these and additional costs that arise from
undue delays because of debris-flow-related road closure in
their risk portfolio.
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